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ABSTRACT 
Considering the US railroad industry, which is characterized by seven integrated firms that provide freight 
services on tracks they own and maintain, this paper provides a structural model that allows to evaluate the 
potential effects of opening the rail network to new firms on prices and investment incentives. In particular, 
we propose a framework for analyzing the tension between static efficiency (pricing behavior) and dynamic 
efficiency (investment behavior). The investment behavior is rendered endogenous by means of a dynamic 
model where the current investment depends on the expected future profits. We then use a forward 
simulation procedure to analyze the effect of an open-access market structure where a new firm uses the 
network of one of the biggest railroad firm. Under a simple access charge equaled to the marginal cost of 
access, investment in network infrastructure decreases by 10% per year, leading to a significant decrease in 
network quality over time. Under this setting, despite the increase of price competition, the decrease in 
network quality leads to a fall in consumer welfare. Other types of (more evolved) access charges might 
even allow to relax the tension between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency, allowing more price 
competition while preserving investment incentives. This topic deserves further research and is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
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 1 Introduction 
The U.S. rail freight industry is organized into seven integrated firms which operate on tracks 
they own and maintain, and a fringe of hundreds of smaller railroads operating mostly in point-to-point 
markets. This concentrated structure is the result of waves of mergers and acquisitions.1,2 Recently, a 
debate has started regarding the market power of the large railroad firms, and in particular their ability 
to foreclose competitive access to their tracks. In this context, an open-access market policy, where the 
incumbent is required to provide access to competitors over (portions of) its network facilities, has been 
put forward to foster competition.3 An open-access market policy would enable competing railroads to 
reach shippers by using rivals’ tracks and terminal facilities under regulated access fees. However, 
several arguments have been advanced against an open-access structure on the U.S. railroad network. 
While the market structure is different in Europe, similar issues are likely to arise with the fourth railway 
package adopted in 2016.4  
One argument is linked to potential cost-inefficiencies due to entry. Berndt et al. (1993a, 1993b) 
and Ivaldi and McCullough (2001, 2008) analyze the railroad cost technology and find important 
operational economies of density. In this case, division of traffic among operators on a single network 
might lead to a loss of freight volume for the incumbent and an increase in the marginal costs of 
providing freight services.  
This paper deals with a second argument, which is that opening the rail network to competition 
might decrease incentives to invest in the network. Track infrastructure is the result of previous and 
continuing costly investment by incumbent firms and it is the main driver of the quality of services in 
                                                     
1 Namely, these seven companies are: Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), Kansas City 
Southern Railway Company (KCS), Union Pacific Railroad (UP), Soo Line Railroad Company (SOO) which 
represents the U.S. operations of the “Canadian Pacific” railways company, CSX Transportation Inc. (CSX), 
Norfolk Southern Combined Railroad Subsidiaries (NS), Grand Trunk Corporation (GTC) which represents the 
U.S. operations of the “Canadian National” railways company. Source: Surface Transportation Board (STB). 
2 See Waters (2007) and Wilner (1997) for a history of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. railroad industry. See 
also Gallamore and Meyer (2014). 
3 See for instance the report from the Government Accountability Office published in 2008. 
4 The 4th Railway Package is a set of six legislative texts designed to complete the single market for Rail services 
(Single European Railway Area, see https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/packages/2013_en for further 
details). In particular, the ‘Governance Directive’ deals with the opening of the market of domestic passenger 
transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infrastructure (Directive 2016/2370/EU).   
the rail industry. Obliging the incumbent to share its facilities with rivals would be an infringement of 
its property rights and could enable the entrant to benefit from good network infrastructure without 
bearing the cost of investment. The entrant would free-ride on the investment in network infrastructure 
and the prospect of expropriation would discourage the incumbent from upgrading the network in the 
future. The issue of investment incentives is particularly important in the railroad industry since it could 
have severe consequences for the quality/capacity/reliability of the network, and hence for the economic 
performance of the industry. This problem of investment expropriation (also called hold-up in the 
economic literature) is also mentioned for example in Motta (2004, Chapter 2), several OECD reports 
(1997, 2006), and in the Christensen (2008) study of the U.S. rail system.  
In this paper, opening the network to competition affects investment behavior in two ways. First, 
to sustain innovation, and thus to support dynamic efficiency, investment requires a rate of return which 
can be obtained through above-marginal cost pricing over time and this leads to a degree of allocative 
inefficiency. Some prospects of profits are necessary to motivate firms to make costly investment. 
Otherwise, a firm would not be able to recoup its fixed cost of investment. Thus, an open-access market 
structure, which may decrease anticipated rates and revenues, could lead to a cut in investment. In other 
words, if railroads do not earn a fair market return, then they reduce investment. Second, sharing a 
network might lead to less rail freight volume for the incumbent.5 Indeed, the smaller the proportion of 
train traffic operated by the owner of the infrastructure, the weaker the incentives to carry out such 
investment as the benefits of investment are shared by other independent train operating companies.  
Taking into account these aspects, the contribution of this paper is to provide an empirical 
framework for analyzing the tension between  pricing behavior that is revised each period affecting the 
short-term efficiency (static efficiency) and investment behavior that impacts long term efficiency 
(dynamic efficiency), in the context of an open-access policy. In particular, this paper presents a 
structural econometric analysis of the potential effect that opening an individual railroad’s network to 
new firms would have on incentives to invest in network infrastructures, under a regulated access price. 
                                                     
5 For example, some customers can shift from the incumbent to the entrant. Moreover, when several railroads are 
active on the same network, it reduces the number of slots available due to the necessary coordination of train 
operations to account for safety and technical constraints. 
We consider investment as a dynamic behavior. Indeed, current investment is a determinant of the 
quality of the network tomorrow, and it depends on the expected returns from the network. If the firm 
anticipates high returns from its network, it will have an incentive to increase its investment today. In 
the model, this dynamic behavior is captured by a choice of investment such that the current marginal 
cost of investment is equal to the expected marginal benefit of investment in the future. Thus, obliging 
a firm to share its network might lead to a decrease in its current investment if the expected future 
benefits decrease too much due to increased competition.  
The econometric model includes two elements. The first element is the estimation of a demand 
model, where the issue of attrition due to the concentration in the US railroad industry over time is fully 
addressed using the methodology developed by Coublucq (2013). This estimated demand model is later 
used to simulate the expected future profits with an open-access market structure. The second element 
is a model of the endogenous decision to invest in the network. The cost of investment is estimated in 
order to rationalize the observed investment as the equilibrium of the model. In the final step, the demand 
and the investment models are used in simulations to find the new equilibrium prices and investment 
with an open-access market structure. Since investment depends on the anticipated future mark-ups, we 
use a forward-simulation procedure. (See Judd, 1998.) 
Using the estimated parameters and the corresponding demand and investment models, we 
simuaate a simple open-access policy where a new entrant pays a marginal cost access fees to provide 
freight services on the network of one of the biggest railroad firm. We find that this simple open-access 
policy decreases the average price in the industry by 6%. At the same time, the investment of the 
incumbent firm decreases by 10% per year, leading to a significant decrease in the quality of the network 
over time. Overall, the welfare of the shippers that use the network decreases. These findings are robust 
to different specifications of the simulations. (See Appendix 3.)  
The framework of this paper also allows to consider other types of (more evolved) access charges, 
which might even allow to relax the tension between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency, allowing 
more price competition while preserving investment incentives. This topic on the optimal design of 
access charge deserves further research and is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the US rail freight industry 
and the data; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, with the trade-off between the static 
efficiency and the dynamic efficiency; Section 4 presents the structural analysis, which includes the 
demand and the investment models, with the estimation results; Section 5 presents the simulation of an 
open-access policy; Section 6 concludes.  
2 Industry background 
2.1 Overview of the US railroad industry 
The US railroad industry is composed of short line, regional and Class 1 railroads. Our dataset 
covers only the Class 1 railroads (i.e., having operating revenue in excess of 346.8 milion US dollars in 
2006), which account for 67% of industry’s mileage, 90% of its employees and 93% of its freight 
revenue. Figure 1 illustrates the network configuration of the industry. The structure of the US rail 
freight industry is characterized by the integration of the network and the provision of freight services. 
In other words, the US freight railroads operate on tracks they own and maintain.  
Figure 1. Network configuration of the US rail freight railroads in 2009
 
(Source: http://www.cn.ca/en/cn-and-class-1-railroads-flash.htm) 
 
The U.S. rail industry is also characterized by a rather “light” regulation. This regulatory freedom 
came from the Staggers Act which deregulated US railroads in 1980. The Staggers Act gave the railroads 
the ability to adjust their rates and capital structures fairly easily and to enter into contracts with shippers. 
This deregulation process was accompanied by several takeover waves and this led to today’s 
concentrated industry. There were 26 firms in 1980 and there are only seven firms today. (See Appendix 
1 for further details.) 
All railroads (Class 1s, short lines and regional railroads) accounted for 41% of freight ton-miles 
in 2007, more than any other mode of transportation. Figure 2 illustrates the increasing importance of 
Class 1 railroads in the US national freight market, where the market share (on a ton-mile basis) of the 
Class 1 US railroad firms has increased from 27% in 1980 to 38% in 2006. The total US national freight 
market is comprised of carriers by air, truck, railroad, water, and pipeline. 
Figure 2. Evolution of the Class 1 railroads market shares in the US national freight market
 
 
2.2 Dataset and description of key variables  
The main source of data is the Analysis of Class1 Railroads (hereafter Analysis) published 
annually by the Association of American Railroads (AAR). The Analysis is based on regulatory reports 
that railroads submit to the Surface Transportation Board (STB). In order to adjust for the effect of 
inflation, we convert the monetary variables in current dollars ($1982) using the Consumer Price Index 
from the Statistical Abstract of the US (see also the US Bureau of Labor Statistics). Table 1 presents 
some descriptive statistics. 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics on US Class1 railroad data (key variables: prices, capital stock, and 
investment6) 
Variable 
Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price $1982 353 .0260265 .0114441 .0103483 .0853767 
Capital stock ,j tK  
$1982 (000) 353 3289.989 2842.068 141.6636 11715.29 
, ,ln( )j t j tk K  $1982 353 7.604252 1.111563 4.953455 9.368649 
Investment $1982 (000)
 
353 148.6064 422.8632 -2204.974 4223.662 
 
 
Price data. Regarding the construction of the price of providing freight services, we build the 
series in the ton-miles unit. In particular, for each firm j  active in year t , the Analysis gives the Total 
Gross Freight Revenue (line 599) and the Total Ton-Miles (line 711). We compute the price of freight 
in ton-miles using the formula: 
 ,
         
.
 -       
j t
Total gross freight revenue of firm j at year t
p
Total ton miles of firm j at year t

 
This allows us to build price series that are consistent with the study of the Surface Transportation 
Board (STB), Study of Railroad Rates: 1985-2007 (2009), using the data from the Analysis. In fact, the 
STB has access to confidential and very detailed data (in particular the Official Waybill Sample that 
records the prices of the commodities shipped in the US), whereas we have access to the Analysis where 
pricing information is not directly available. For a particular year t , the industry price index is computed 
by a weighted average of the prices ,j tp  of active firms, where the weights are equal to the market share 
of firm j  at year t : 
 , | 1
 -       
.
  -    
j t g
Total ton miles of firm j at year t
s
Total industry ton miles at year t
   
We compute a price index where the Total Gross Freight Revenue in current dollars is expressed 
in real $1982 using the Consumer Price Index as a deflator. (See the Statistical Abstract of the US.) In 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, we show that the evolution of the price index is consistent with the evolution of 
the price index built by the Surface Transportation Board. Thus, using ton-miles allows us to consistently 
                                                     
6 At the beginning of the 1980s, some railroad firms have abandoned some unprofitable lines and disinvested. Our 
theoretical framework can accommodate negative investment as well. 
reproduce the evolution of railroad rates reported by the Surface Transportation Board. Using ton-miles 
also allows to use data from the US Department of Transport to estimate the total size of the freight 
market in the US, which is used to construct the market share of each railroad firm (and the market share 
of the outside alternative). 
 
Figure 3. Industry price index (unit of measure: ton-miles, in real $1982, 1980 = 100) 
 
 
Figure 4. Rail rate index (1985 to 2007): Real revenue per ton-miles (1985 = 100) 
 
 
Capital and investment in the network. In this paper, we focus on the investment in network 
infrastructures. We take the definition of the Schedule 350 of the regulatory R1 Reports published by 
the Surface Transportation Board. This definition includes investment in tunnels, bridges, ties, tracks 
and rail materials, ballasts, fences, and signalling materials for instance.  
The construction of the capital stock follows the methodology of Berndt, Friedlaender, and 
McCullough (1992). Accordingly, we start from an authoritative estimate of the reproduction cost of 
capital in 1973 using Nelson (1975) and update the stock of capital of firm j  using the perpetual 
inventory relation:  
 , 1 , ,
(1 ) ,j t j t j tK K d I     (1) 
where ,j tI  represents the real investment (in $1982) at year t . The depreciation rate d  is derived by 
solving an equation that allows railroad capital to depreciate exponentially over 25 years to a salvage 
value of 10 percent.7 The Analysis reports nominal investment which is then converted into real value 
($1982). The main difficulty lies in measuring this nominal investment component for way and 
structures capital. Before 1982, railroads used “betterment” accounting in which the work on railroad 
way and structures was listed as an expense and thus excluded from the undepreciated book value of 
road (line 67 in the Analysis). Thus, a first difference of the undepreciated book value of road allows 
measuring the nominal investment at every year. After 1982, the railroad industry adopted a depreciation 
accounting system, where the work on way and structures is added to the book value of road. It is thus 
necessary to remove the expenditures linked to the maintenance of the network (line 174 minus line 172 
in the Analysis) from the undepreciated book value of road and then do a first difference to obtain the 
nominal investment. This perpetual inventory process is iterated to bring the series of way and structure 
capital until 2006. Figure 5 shows the evolution of investment over time.8      
                                                     
7 The 25-years assumption is based on Berndt et al. (1992). 
8 For each year, Figure 5 shows a weighted average of the investment of the active firms, weighted by their market 
shares. 
Figure 5. Evolution of investment (in thousands, real $1982)
 
 
 
3 Theoretical background 
The objective of this paper is to provide an empirical framework to analyze the tension between 
static efficiency (pricing behavior) and dynamic efficiency (investment behavior) in the US rail freight 
industry, in the context of an open-access policy. This paper relies on a two-stage equilibrium model, 
with a choice of price at each period and a choice of quality over time through the investment decision.9 
3.1 Pricing behavior and demand function 
We consider a model of differentiated products where firms engage in Bertrand competition in 
prices. (See Berry, 1994.) This allows defining the demand function of the consumers, i.e., the shippers 
in the US rail freight industry. The demand function allows us to define the market share and the profit 
function that determine the pricing behavior of the railroad firms.  
                                                     
9 There is a third decision which is an exit decision. However, this paper focuses on the investment decision. The 
exit decision is useful to deal with the selection issue due to mergers. (See Appendix 1.) (See also Coublucq, 2013, 
for further details.)  
Following Berry (1994), we group the firms into two groups and exclusive sets, 0, 1g  , where 
0g   denotes the outside option, which is the freight provided by air, truck, water, and pipeline, and 
1g   denotes the group containing the railroad firms. The utility of a shipper i  from choosing the 
railroad firm j  is:  
 , , , , , ,
(1 ) ,i j t j t g t g i j tu         (2) 
where ,j t  is the mean-utility of choosing railroad j  at time t  and , ,i j t  is identically and 
independently distributed with the extreme value distribution. The variable ,g t  is common to all firms 
in group g  and follows a Cardell (1997) distribution ( )C  , with (0;1)  . The parameter   
represents the within group correlation of all the alternatives in the group 1g  .  
In the expression of the mean-utility, , , , ,j t j t j t j tk p      , , ,ln( )j t j tk K  represents the 
impact of network quality on the utility of shippers, ,j tp  is the price of using the railroad firm j  to 
provide the freight service, and ,j t represents the unobservable efficiency of railroad firm j  at time t. 
The capital stock is updated at each time period using the relation , , 1 , 1(1 )j t j t j tK K d I    , where 
, 1j tI   stands for investment in the network infrastructure. 
The market share formula for this nested logit model is: 
 
,
, , | ,
1
, ,
  
exp
1
(  , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,
j t
j t j t g g t
g t g t
g
s s s
D D 


  

 
 
   
 
 
  

δ δ δ
 (3) 
where , | (.)j t gs  denotes the within market share of firm j  at time t  in the group 1g  , δ  denotes the 
vector of mean-utilities of all railroad firms,   denotes the within group correlation of railroad firms, 
and , ,exp( / (1 ))j tg t j g
D  

  . The market share of the outside alternative is given by 
1
0, ,( ) 1t g tg
s D   δ, . 
From Equation (3), we see that the market share, denoted by , (.)j ts , is a function of the 
characteristics of the industry, denoted by 1, , , 1, , ,( , , , , ; , , , , )t tt t j t J t t j t J tK K K   w , and the prices 
of the railroads firms, denoted by the vector 1, ,( , , )tt t J tp p p , where tJ  denotes the number of 
active firms at date t .  
Thus, we can define the profit function that determines the pricing behavior as:  
 , , , ,
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ,j t t t j t j t j t t t tp mc s M  w p p w  (4) 
where ,j tp  is the price charged by firm j , ,j ts  is the market share of firm j , tM  represents the size 
of the freight market at date t , and ,j tmc  is the cost of providing freight services on its own network.  
Using Equation (4), the first-order condition for pricing behavior of firm , 1, , tj j J  is:  
 
,
, , ,
,
( ) 0,
j t
j t j t j t
j t
s
p mc s
p

  
  (5) 
From Equation (5), we show that the price equilibrium vector for all the active firms is a function of the 
state variables, denoted by 
tw , that is ( )t tp w , which allows to define the profit function (4) as 
    , , ,j t t j t t t tp w w w . 
3.2 Investment behavior 
The pricing decision above is static and impacts the spot profit function, denoted , ( )j t t w . In 
contrast, investment is a dynamic decision and it depends on the anticipated future benefit. In addition 
to receiving profits, an active firm incurs a cost of investment, ,( )j tc I . 
We define the value function of firm j  at date t  as:  
 
 
,
, ,
( )
, , 1 1( ) sup ( ) ( ( )) ( | ) ,
j t t
j t t j t
i
t j t t j t t tV c I E V    
w
ww w w w
 (6) 
where   is the discount rate, conditions at time t  are summarized by a vector of state variables with 
1, , , 1, , ,( , , , , ; , , , , )t tt t j t J t t j t J tK K K   w , and  , 1 1( | )j t t tE V  w w  represents the anticipated 
future benefit. 
In Equation (6), the function ,( )j tc I  should be interpreted as an adjustment cost function. This is 
because it takes one period for new capital to be installed by firms, and, at date 1t  , the firm must bear 
the cost of adjusting the capital stock, denoted , 1( )j tc I  .
10 
Using Equation (6), the first-order condition that determines the investment behavior of the firm 
is: 
 
, , 1 1
, ,
( ) ( | )
0.
j t j t t t
j t j t
c I V w w
E
I I

 
  
   
   
 (7) 
This first-order condition can be rewritten as: 
 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, , 1
( ) ( , , , | )
,
j t j t j t j t j t j t t
j t j t
c I V K w
E
I K


      

  
  
   
K ξ
 (8) 
since the perpetual inventory method that we use to construct the stock of capital, 
, 1 , ,(1 )j t j t j tK K d I    , implies that , 1 , 1j t j tK I   . Equations (7) and (8) captures the idea that 
the level of investment is such that the marginal cost of investment is equal to the anticipated marginal 
benefit of investing in the network. This captures the idea that investment is a dynamic activity. 
Using the envelop theorem, we can write:  
 
, , , , , , , , , ,
, ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1
, 1
( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
[ ( , , , , )]
(1 ) .
j t j t j t j t j t t j t j t j t j t j t t
j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t t
j t
V K J K J
K K
E V K J
d
K
  


   
       

 

 

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
K ξ K ξ
K ξ
 (9) 
Combining Equations (8) and (9), we obtain:  
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
 (10) 
where  
                                                     
10 This assumes that capital is a fixed (rather than variable) input. 
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t j t j t
j t j t
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M p mc
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 
  
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 
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 
   (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) capture the following idea. To sustain innovation, and thus to support dynamic 
efficiency, investment requires a rate of return which can be obtained through above-marginal cost 
pricing over time and this leads to a degree of allocative inefficiency. In other words, some prospects of 
profits are necessary to motivate firms to make costly investment. Otherwise, a firm would not be able 
to recoup its fixed cost of investment. 
 
3.3 The static-dynamic efficiency trade-off: Comment 
In the model, an open-access market structure, which creates more competition and a decrease in prices 
which improves the allocative efficiency and the consumer welfare at the current date (static efficiency), 
leads also to a decrease in the anticipated mark-ups in Equation (11), i.e., in the return on the investment, 
and this leads to a decrease in the incentives to invest in the network at date t  in Equation (10). Over 
time the decrease in investment decreases the quality of the network, which has a negative impact on 
the consumer welfare (dynamic inefficiency). This is the trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency with an open-access policy, which is illustrated in the simulations in Section 5 with a simple 
access charge equaled to the marginal cost of provided access. The framework of this paper also allows 
to consider other types of (more evolved) access charges, which might even allow to relax the tension 
between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency (i.e. allowing more price competition while preserving 
investment incentives). This topic on the optimal design of access charge is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
A last remark should be added regarding the relation between the volume of traffic and the trade-
off between static and dynamic efficiencies with an open-access policy. As mentioned in the 
introduction, sharing a network might lead to less rail freight volume for the incumbent, and the smaller 
the proportion of train traffic operated by the owner of the infrastructure, the weaker the incentives to 
carry out such investment as the benefits of investment are shared by other independent train operating 
companies. This second effect deserves more comments. In general, opening the network to competition 
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the rail traffic of the incumbent. For example, if an open-
access policy leads to an important decrease in prices, the overall increase in the rail traffic might be 
such that the incumbent carries more freight, and this would have a positive impact on revenue. We can 
show that this second effect is captured by the term 
, 1 , 1j t j t
s K
 
  in Equation (11). In that case, it would 
be the balance between the negative effect of lower price and the positive effect of more freight volume 
that would determine the overall impact on revenue and on the incentive to invest in the network.  
4 The structural analysis and estimation results 
4.1 Specification and estimation of the demand model 
This section presents the estimation of the demand model presented in Equations (2) and (3). 
Following Berry (1994), for a particular railroad firm j  at year t , the estimating equation for the 
demand model (2) is:  
 , 0, , , , | ,
ln ln ln .j t t j t j t j t g j ts s k p s         (12) 
The concentration of the US railroad industry through mergers and acquisitions leads to an 
attrition issue. Indeed, while there were 26 Class 1 firms in 1980, only seven firms remain in 2006. (See 
Appendix 1.) Thus we need to consider the following moment conditions , , ,( | , 1)j t j t j tE z r  , where 
,j tz  denotes the instruments and , 1j tr   if firm 𝑗 is observed at date t . If the merged firms differ from 
the non-merged firms in ways that are difficult to quantify, then the following moment conditions would 
be different from zero, that is , , ,( | , 1) 0j t j t j tE z r   .
11 Following Coublucq (2013), we consider the 
error term , , , , ,( | , 1)j t j t j t j t j te E z r    , which is equal to zero in expectation by construction. The 
estimating equation becomes:  
 , , ,, 0, , , , | ,
| ,ln ln l ( )n 1 .j t t j t j t j j t j t j tt g j ts s k p s E z r e           (13) 
The methodology proposed by Coublucq (2013) uses a dynamic model of exit to endogenize 
attrition and compute the correction term for attrition, , , ,( | , 1)j t j t j tE z r  . In his framework, the 
                                                     
11 Coublucq (2013) provides an estimation algorithm to deal with endogenous attrition due to concentration in the 
US railroad industry. The economic intuition behind the selection issue is that the better management takes the 
control through mergers. Indeed, Coublucq (2013) shows that that the concentration of the US railroad industry 
has led to a reallocation of assets from less efficient to more efficient firms. 
unobserved firm efficiency follows the process , , 1j t j j tc    , where jc  represents firm fixed-effect 
and , 1j t   represents the exit value. Incorporating firm fixed-effect means that firms are selected out of 
the sample based on unobserved fixed heterogeneity. (See Wooldridge, 1995, and Semykina and 
Wooldridge, 2005.) Incorporating the exit value , 1j t   allows to control for endogenous attrition. (See 
Coublucq, 2012.) Moreover, there is a lag of one period between ,j t  and , 1j t   since a firm is observed 
at date t  if it has decided to stay active in the market the period before. The lag of one period implies 
that we need to condition on the past information set, denoted 1tw , to compute the correction term for 
attrition. (See Coublucq, 2013.)  
Using the process of the unobserved firm efficiency in (13), we obtain the following estimating 
equation:  
 , , , , , | 1 , 1 1 ,
ln ln ln ( ) ,j t o t j t j t j t g j j t t j ts s k p s c e           w  (14) 
where , 1 1( )j t tw    denotes the correction term for attrition. We assume that the exit value follows an 
exponential distribution, denoted by (.)G . This implies that the firm gets a strictly positive scrap value 
when it decides to exit and sells its assets on a resale market. The correction term for attrition is then 
computed as:  
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 (15) 
where 
1
, 1 , 1 1( ( ))j t j t tG P w

    and , 1 1( )j t tP  w  represents the probability that the firm j  stays active 
in the market at date 1t  . The threshold , 1j t   means that the firm stays in the market if its scrap value 
, 1j t   is lower than the threshold , 1j t  . If the scrap value is higher than the threshold , 1j t  , then the 
firm exits the market and sells its assets through a resale market. (See Coublucq, 2013.) 
Next, we eliminate the firm fixed-effect by a first-difference in (14), which leads to the following 
estimating equation: 
 , , , , | 1 , 1 ,
ln ,j t j t j t j t g j t j ty k p s e                 (16) 
where   denotes the first-difference operator: , , , 1j t j t j te e e    .  
From this equation, we estimate the demand parameters ( , , )    using a GMM procedure. The 
parameter   represents the importance of endogenous attrition. In the estimation, we include a 
quadratic time trend in order to capture disembodied technical change. As instruments, we use cost-
shifter variables such as the miles of road operated (ROAD), the average length of haul (HAUL), the lag 
of these six variables, and the lag of the BLP instrument for ROAD.12 The two variables ROAD and 
HAUL are used as instruments since they are considered as cost-shifters. (See Berndt et al., 1993a and 
1993b, Ivaldi and McCullough, 2001, 2008.) Other instruments include the lag of capital stock, , 1j tK  , 
and the second lag of the correction term, , 2j t  . We have also added , 2j tK   as an instrument. A 
discussion of the validity of the instruments and the estimation algorithm is in Appendix 2. (For further 
details, see Coublucq, 2013.)  
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the demand parameters. All coefficients have the 
expected signs. The correction term is significant at the 5% level. This confirms that the methodology 
of Coublucq (2013) helps to deal with endogenous attrition due to concentration.13 The Sargan test does 
not reject the over-identifying restriction, which therefore validates the choice of the instruments. The 
estimated demand model is then used later in Section 5 to simulate the future mark-ups with an open-
access market structure. 
                                                     
12 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). 
13 Coublucq (2013) shows that the price and the capital stock coefficients are under-estimated when the issue of 
endogenous attrition is not taken into account. 
Table 2. Demand estimates 
Variable Coefficient 
Price (-α) -67.468*** 
(21.600) 
Within correlation (σ) .479 
(.388) 
Correction term 𝜆 .628** 
(.275) 
𝑘𝑗,𝑡 = ln (𝐾𝑗,𝑡) .376  
(.256) 
Time effect14 Yes 
Number of observations 353 
Sargan (𝜒2(7)) 6.129 
(p = 0.5250) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.2 Marginal costs 
Using the demand estimates, we recover the marginal costs for each firm at a particular year by 
assuming that the firms engage in Bertrand competition in prices. Using the first-order condition for 
pricing behavior in Equation (5), with the demand estimates from section 4.1, we obtain the mark-up 
with the following formula: 
 , ,
, | 1 ,
1
.
(1 (1 ))
j t j t
j t g j t
p mc
s s

  

 
  
 
Then we recover the marginal costs from the estimates of mark-ups using the formula  
𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡 = −(𝑝𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡) + 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 . 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics about the mark-ups and marginal costs. The recovered 
marginal costs are used later in Section 5 to solve for the new equilibrium prices under the open-access 
market structure.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for mark-ups and marginal costs 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Mark-ups ($1982) 353 .0081 .0005 .0077 .0102 
Marginal costs ($1982) 353 .0179 .01170 .0003 .0776 
4.3 The investment model 
This section presents the estimation of the adjustment cost function of the dynamic model of 
investment (Section 3.2). In particular, the estimation of the adjustment cost function rationalizes the 
observed investment behavior as the equilibrium of the dynamic game. 
                                                     
14  A quadratic time trend is used to control for time effect. 
Equation (6) defines the value function of firm j  at date t , with 
1, , , 1, , ,( , , , , ; , , , , ),t tt t j t J t t j t J tK K K   w  where ,j tK  represents the observable value of the 
network and ,j t  represents the unobservable quality (or efficiency) of freight services provided by firm 
j . We are able to recover the firm efficiency, , ,j t  ( , )j t , using the demand parameters 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )   in 
Equation (12). 
The only dynamic parameter relates to the adjustment cost function, 
2
, ;( )j t j tc I bI . The parameter 
b  represents the importance of the adjustment cost. For example, a parameter significantly different 
from zero means that the capital stock is costly to adjust. (See Section 3.2.) 
We use the GMM-Euler equation framework of Hansen and Singleton (1982) to estimate the 
parameter b  in the adjustment cost function. Combining the first-order condition (8) with the envelop 
theorem (9), we obtain an Euler equation that can be estimated in a standard GMM framework. We 
obtain the following estimating equation: 
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 (17) 
where tw  represents the information available at date t .  
We need to choose the instruments to form a GMM estimator. In Equation (17), the operator tE  
represents the expectation conditioned on agents’ period t  information set, tw . As in Hansen and 
Singleton (1982), we use the economic model to generate a family of orthogonality conditions which 
are used to construct a criterion function. Then we estimate the dynamic parameter b  by GMM. Let 
,j tz  be a vector of variables that are in the agent’s information set at date t . We form the following 
orthogonality conditions:  
 
'
, , , 1 1 1( , , ; ) 0,j t j t j t t tE h I I b     z ,K ξ  (18) 
where 
'
,j tz  is a q  dimensional vector, 
, 1
, 1 ,
, 1
(.) (1 )
j t
j t j t
j t
h b d I I
K

 




     
 and E  denotes the 
unconditional expectation operator. We construct the function 
'
, , , , 1 1 1( ) ( , , ; )j t j t j t j t t tg b h I I b   z ,K ξ , 
and we minimize the quadratic form ( )Q b  with respect to the parameter b :  
 
( ) ( ) ' ( ),Q b g b Wg b
 (19) 
where the weighting matrix is written as 
1 1
, ,
,
( ' ) ( ' )j t j t
j t
W Z Z z z    as for linear two-stage least 
squares. Variables that represent the information available at date t  are natural candidates for 
instruments. These includes price, mark-up, the number of active firms, and the average length of 
HAUL.1516׳ 
Table 4 reports the estimate for the parameter of the adjustment cost function. This parameter is 
significantly different from zero.17 This means that capital stock adjustment is costly. The economic 
intuition is that it may take a full period for new capital to be ordered, delivered, and installed. This is 
consistent with the perpetual inventory method that we used to construct the capital stock, that is 
, , 1 , 1(1 ) .j t j t j tK K d I     
Table 4. Adjustment cost of investment 
 Coefficient 
Adjustment cost of 
investment (b) 
1.970873 
(1.2239) 
Number of 
observations 
291 
Sargan test 2 (3) 2.94461   
 (p = 0.4002)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The estimated cost of investment is used in the simulation of the investment with an open-access 
market structure. The cost of investment is an important parameter in the model since the equilibrium 
                                                     
15 The mark-ups for each firm can be recovered using the demand estimates with the first-order condition for the 
pricing behavior. (See section 4.2.) 
16 The last variable, HAUL, is useful since it is an important cost-shifter, and it can be related to the profitability 
of the firms and thus to the investment behavior. 
17 The standard errors are computed by bootstrap. The adjustment cost of investment is almost significant at 10%. 
Since the dataset is rather small, we cannot expect a large efficiency in the parameter estimates.  
level of investment is determined by equating the marginal cost of investment with the expected future 
benefit.  
5 Simulating an open-access policy 
We now use the estimated demand and supply side parameters to simulate an open-access policy 
and quantify the impacts on prices and investment of mandating access to a particular network. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that the network of the incumbent firm "Burlington Northern"(denoted 
firm j ) is opened to an entrant (denoted firm n ).18,19 The market structure is the same for all the other 
firms. We assume that this new market structure begins in 2006. Then, the investment of firm j   in its 
network in 2006 is determined by the expected future benefits from 2006 onward. Once we know the 
investment in the network in 2006, we compute the value of the network in 2007 through the perpetual 
inventory relation. (See Equation (1).) We repeat this procedure for 30 years, until 2036. This shows the 
evolution of investment over a 30-year horizon. For the following, we denote 2006 by 0t , 2007 by 1t , 
until 2036. We will compare the investment under two market structures: the current structure where 
each firm provides freight services on its own network, and this specific open-access market structure. 
The characteristics of the entrant are summarized by its mean-utility, denoted 
0,n t
 . The entrant 
uses the network of firm j , denoted 
0,j t
K . Thus we can write the mean-utility of the entrant as 𝛿𝑛,𝑡0 =
𝜃𝑘𝑗,𝑡0 − 𝛼𝑝𝑛,𝑡0 + ξ𝑛,𝑡0,  where 0 0, ,ln( )j t j tk K , 0,n tp  denotes the prices charged by the entrant to 
provide freight services, and 
0,n t
  represents the intrinsic characteristics of the entrant. We assume that 
0,n t
  is equal to the average efficiency of other active firms in 2006, that is 
2006
0, 2006 ,20061
ˆ(1 )
J
n t kk
J 

  , where 2006 7J  , since only seven firms are active in 2006. For the 
                                                     
18 The biggest railroad firm is “Burlington Northern”, which represents 36% of the freight services provided by 
the US Class 1 railroad firms in 2006. 
19 The model allows to open to entrants the networks of several incumbents. However, for the sake of clarity, in 
the simulations presented, it is enough to simulate the opening of only one network to illustrate the potential effects 
of an open-access policy on prices and investment. 
simulations, we keep this variable fixed over time from 2006 onward. We also keep ,
ˆ
k t  fixed over time 
at their 2006 values for other firms, ( , )k t . 
We consider the profit of an entrant at a particular date t , 0t t , 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 = (𝑝𝑛,𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑠𝑛,𝑡(𝒑𝒕)𝑀𝑡 , 
where ,n tp  is the price charged by firm n , ,n ts  is the market share of the entrant, tM  represents the 
size of the freight market, and a  is the cost of providing freight services on the network of the incumbent 
j . This cost, denoted by a , includes the (regulated) level of the access charge that the entrant pays to 
have access to the network of firm j , and its own cost of labor, energy, and material for instance. The 
price charged by the firm n  is determined by the first-order condition:  
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  (20) 
We need to know the cost, denoted by a , to derive the optimal price of the entrant n . We assume 
that it is equal to the marginal cost of the incumbent j  in 2006, denoted as ,2006jmc .
20  (See Table 3.) 
Using the first-order conditions (5) and (20) for prices, we determine the equilibrium prices for the eight 
active firms.21 These equilibrium prices depend on the marginal costs, the access charge, the size of the 
freight market, the intrinsic efficiencies  , and the levels of the capital stocks K  for all active firms. 
Since we focus on the impact of open-access on the investment of the firm j , we consider the evolution 
of the capital stock of firm j , denoted ,j tK , and we keep everything else constant at their 2006 values. 
For example, from 2006 onward, the market size is set to its 2006 value and the marginal costs for each 
firm are also constant at their 2006 values. This allows us to isolate the impact of an open-access policy 
                                                     
20 We need an assumption about the level of cost for the entrant. We assume that it is equal to the marginal cost of 
the incumbent. In this way, the entrant is as efficient as the incumbent in terms of cost. If we assume a more 
efficient entrant in terms of cost, then price competition becomes tougher, as well as the impact on investment 
disincentives.  
21 Regarding the profit of the incumbent, we assume that the access charge is equal to the marginal cost of providing 
access. Then the profit from access is zero for the firm 𝑗. This is coherent with the assumption that the cost of entry 
for the entrant is equal to 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡. Indeed, from section 3.1, 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡 represents the whole cost of providing freight on 
the network of firm 𝑗, which includes the part related to the network, denoted by  
𝑠% × 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡, and the part related to the cost of labor and materials, denoted by (1 − 𝑠%) × 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡. Thus, under our 
assumption, the level of access charge is equal to 𝑠% × 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡. Then the cost of entry for the new firm is equal to 
the level of the access charge, that is 𝑠% × 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡, plus the cost of material and labor due to the provision of freight 
on the network of firm j , that is (1 − 𝑠%) × 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡. This implies that the cost of entry is equal to 𝑚𝑐𝑗,𝑡. 
on the investment of the railroad firm j . In Appendix 3, we check the robustness of the results by 
allowing the capital stocks of competitors to increase over time as well. 
The equilibrium investment of the firm j  is characterized by the first-order condition (10). Since 
we keep the intrinsic characteristics of every firm constant at the 2006 values, and the perpetual 
inventory relation for the capital stock is deterministic, there is no more uncertainty about the future. 
We can remove the expectation operator and write the first-order condition for 0t t  as: 
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 (21) 
where bˆ  is the estimated cost of investment and T  represents the number of periods in the forward-
simulation procedure. We assume that 25T   periods. The 25-year assumption is based on Berndt, 
Friedlaender, and McCullough (1992).22  
From Equation (21), we can write the derivative of the profit with respect to the capital stock 
0t t  as:
23  
 
, 1 , 1
, 1
, 1 , 1
( ) ,
j t j t
j t j
j t j t
s
M p mc
K K
  

 
 
 
   (22) 
where the market size M  and the marginal cost jmc  are fixed at their 2006 values. This particular 
open-access policy creates more competition and thus a decrease in prices. This leads to a decrease in 
future mark-ups and a decrease in the incentives to invest in the network at date t  in Equation (21).24 
                                                     
22 As mentioned in Berndt, Friedlaender, and McCullough (1992), economic depreciation is derived by solving an 
equation that allows railroad equipment to depreciate exponentially over 25 years to a salvage value of 10 per cent. 
23 We assumed the access charge is equal to the marginal cost of providing access, then the profit from access is 
null for the firm 𝑗. In this way, we only focus on the expropriation issue mentioned in the introduction and its 
impact on the investment in network infrastructures. If the access charge is higher than the cost of providing access, 
then the profit function should include the profit from providing access. Thus, the first-order conditions for prices 
and investment of firm 𝑗 will be different (see the conclusion about this issue). 
24 If the prices decrease due to competition leads to an important increase in the volume of freight, then the market 
is more attractive and the firm invests more on the network. This is captured by the term 𝜕𝑠𝑗,𝑡+1 𝜕𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1⁄ .  
To find the optimal investment at date 0t , we use the following algorithm. (See Judd, 1998, for 
additional details.) We need to specify the shape of an investment policy function. This is necessary in 
order to forward-simulate the capital stock of firm j  (the future capital stocks of firm j  depends on 
its future investments, and thus on the future investment policy function). We specify the investment 
policy function as: , , ,j t j tI K where 0.   The algorithm finds the parameter   such that the 
investment policy function is compatible with the first-order condition for the investment in Equation 
(21). Then we can compute the investment in 2006 using the investment policy function. For a given 
value of   in the investment policy function, the algorithm is as follows:  
1) Using the capital stocks at date 0t , we compute the investment of firm j  at date 0t ; 
2) We compute the capital firm of firm j  at date 1t , using the perpetual inventory relation (1); 
3) We solve for the optimal prices at date 1t  using the first-order conditions for prices (5) and 
(20); 
4) We compute the derivative of the profit function with respect to the capital stock, 
1 1, ,
;j t j tK   
5) We compute the investment policy function at date 1t : 1 1, ,j t j tI K ; 
6) We update the capital stock of firm j  at date 2t  using the perpetual inventory relation (1); 
7) We solve for the equilibrium prices at date 2t , and we obtain the derivative of the profit with 
respect to the capital stock, 
2 2, ,j t j t
K  ; 
8) We repeat the steps 5-7 for the next T  periods;25 
9) Then we compute the discounted sum of the future marginal benefits of investment in the 
network (that is the right-hand side of (21)); 
10) We construct the function:  
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where 
0 0, ,j t j t
i K  and the second term is also a function of the investment policy parameter   
(according to step 9); 
                                                     
25 We take 30T   periods. We have checked that the results are robust when we forward-simulate over a bigger 
number of periods. 
11) We find the parameter    that solves the equation ( ) 0f    and we compute the investment 
at period 0t , i.e. 0 0,t j tI K . 
We repeat this algorithm for every period over a 30 year time horizon, by changing the starting 
date at the step 1 of the algorithm, 𝑡 = 𝑡0 + 1, 𝑡0 + 2, … , 𝑡0 + 29. This gives a different investment 
policy function for each date.  
Table 5 and Figure 6 present the results of the simulations for investment under the current market 
structure and the specific open-access policy for the firm j . This specific open-access policy leads to a 
decrease of investment by 10% per year, which leads to an increasing fall in the capital stock that reaches 
a loss of 10% in 30 years. (See Figure 7.) This is due to two effects. First, opening the network to a new 
firm leads to a decrease in equilibrium prices (namely, -6% per year) which is translated in a decrease 
in the future benefits from investing in the network. 26  Second, sharing the traffic leads to a lower market 
share for the incumbent between 10% and 13%.27 (See Figure 8.) The smaller the proportion of train 
traffic operated by the owner of the infrastructure, the weaker the incentives to carry out such investment 
as the benefits of investment are shared by other independent train operating companies.  
Furthermore, we compute the utility of the shippers who use the network of firm 𝑗, denoted 𝛿?̅?,𝑡 , 
using the formula of the mean-utility, 𝛿?̅?,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛼?̅?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜉?̅?,𝑡, where ?̅?𝑗,𝑡 is the average price charged 
by firm 𝑗 and the entrant, and 𝜉?̅?,𝑡 is the average of the intrinsic efficiencies of both firms, (𝜉𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑛,𝑡) 2⁄ . 
Overall, Table 6 and Figure 9 show that the utility of shippers who use the network of firm j  decreases 
exponentially to reach a loss of 10% after 30 years. 
Appendix 3 provides several robustness results. It provides a different version of the algorithm, 
by allowing the capital stocks of competitors to increase over time, which are kept constant in the above 
algorithm. We assume that the investment policy function is the same for each firm.28 Instead of solving 
for one equation (as in step 11 in the above algorithm), we solve for the parameter   that minimizes the 
                                                     
26 The decrease in the average price charged by the incumbent “Burlington Northern” and the entrant is between 
10 and 16% per year. 
27 Since the size of the US freight market is fixed, a decrease in the market share of a firm is equivalent to a 
decrease of its freight volume/rail traffic.  
28 It is possible to specify different investment policy functions for each firm, but the computational burden 
increases significantly due to convergence issues. 
norm ( ) ( ) ' ( )N f f   , where ( )f   denotes the set of first-order conditions for the investment of 
the seven active firms in 2006.  
In the simulation presented in this paper, an open-access policy where the access price is given at 
the marginal cost of providing access leads to a decrease in prices and a decrease in the investment 
incentives. In the long-run, this leads to a lower welfare for the shippers. 
Overall, this paper shows that an open-access policy must be implemented carefully. The impact 
on the investment behavior may be important. An open-access market structure, by reducing anticipated 
rates and revenues, decreases the economic incentives for investment in network infrastructures. 
Therefore, in the long-run, the quality of the network might decrease and this has a negative impact on 
the performance of the US railroad industry.29  
  
                                                     
29 There is a consensus recognizing that the improvement in the network after 1980 was a key element to explain 
the performance of the US railroad industry. 
  
Table 5. Open-access, investment, and value of network infrastructures (in thousands, $1982) 
 No open-access Open-access 
Date Capital stock Investment Capital stock Investment 
2006 8663.6396 1640.2087 8663.6396 1475.3097 
2007 9663.6054 1647.1559 9498.7063 1477.3628 
2008 10596.621 1649.9794 10274.115 1476.9314 
2009 11463.510 1649.9276 10991.789 1474.8967 
2010 12266.284 1647.9873 11654.393 1471.7805 
2011 13007.793 1644.8200 12264.913 1468.0367 
2012 13691.337 1640.9516 12826.573 1463.9379 
2013 14320.499 1636.5923 13342.627 1459.6851 
2014 14898.807 1632.0978 13816.292 1455.3919 
2015 15429.883 1627.5287 14250.660 1451.1743 
2016 15917.143 1622.9874 14648.711 1447.0954 
2017 16363.853 1618.6269 15013.266 1443.1954 
2018 16773.192 1614.4582 15346.981 1439.4988 
2019 17148.111 1610.4532 15652.338 1436.0180 
2020 17491.319 1606.6759 15931.648 1432.7574 
2021 17805.386 1603.1327 16187.057 1429.7160 
2022 18092.701 1599.8234 16420.549 1426.8883 
2023 18355.474 1596.7434 16633.959 1424.2665 
2024 18595.747 1593.8849 16828.976 1421.8411 
2025 18815.407 1591.2383 17007.156 1419.6016 
2026 19016.186 1588.7925 17169.929 1417.5370 
2027 19199.683 1586.5360 17318.608 1415.6360 
2028 19367.362 1584.4569 17454.399 1413.8878 
2029 19520.571 1582.5436 17578.406 1412.2816 
2030 19660.544 1580.7845 17691.644 1410.8070 
2031 19788.415 1579.1686 17795.038 1409.4542 
2032 19905.219 1577.6853 17889.439 1408.2139 
2033 20011.909 1576.3246 17975.623 1407.0774 
2034 20109.354 1575.0771 18054.302 1406.0364 
2035 20198.349 1573.9338 18126.126 1405.0833 
2036 20279.625 1572.8866 18191.688 1404.2111 
Figure 6. Investment and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
 
 
Figure 7. Capital stock and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
 
 
Figure 8. Market share of firm j and open-access
 
 
Figure 9. Utility on firm j  network and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
 
  
Table 6. Shippers’ utility on firm j  network (in thousands, $1982) 
Date No open-access Open-access % Variation 
2006 3252.3095 3252.5823 0 
2007 3628.1357 3566.4303 -1.70 
2008 3978.7995 3857.8569 -3.04 
2009 4304.6103 4127.5850 -4.11 
2010 4606.3243 4376.6157 -4.99 
2011 4885.0123 4606.0719 -5.71 
2012 5141.9150 4817.1642 -6.32 
2013 5378.3786 5011.1165 -6.83 
2014 5595.7292 5189.1373 -7.27 
2015 5795.3284 5352.3889 -7.64 
2016 5978.4599 5501.9911 -7.97 
2017 6146.3512 5639.0047 -8.25 
2018 6300.1966 5764.4272 -8.50 
2019 6441.1057 5879.1917 -8.72 
2020 6570.0967 5984.1669 -8.92 
2021 6688.1355 6080.1590 -9.09 
2022 6796.1196 6167.9142 -9.24 
2023 6894.8799 6248.1216 -9.38 
2024 6985.1842 6321.4162 -9.50 
2025 7067.7408 6388.3829 -9.61 
2026 7143.2017 6449.5590 -9.71 
2027 7212.1668 6505.4383 -9.80 
2028 7275.1872 6556.4736 -9.88 
2029 7332.7691 6603.0804 -9.95 
2030 7385.3766 6645.6392 -10.02 
2031 7433.4353 6684.4987 -10.07 
2032 7477.3351 6719.9781 -10.13 
2033 7517.4332 6752.3694 -10.18 
2034 7554.0567 6781.9399 -10.22 
2035 7587.5048 6808.9338 -10.26 
2036 7618.0514 6833.5747 -10.30 
6 Conclusion 
This paper proposes an empirical methodology for analyzing the trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency in the context of an open access policy. By opening the network to new firms, an 
open-access structure increases competition and presumably improves static efficiency. However, the 
entrant benefits from a high quality network without bearing the cost of investment (expropriation). By 
allowing entrants to free-ride on network investment, an open-access market structure discourages firms 
from making investments. This is supported by two arguments. First, to sustain innovation, and thus 
support dynamic efficiency, investment requires a rate of return which can be obtained through above-
marginal cost pricing over time and this leads to a degree of allocative inefficiency. Indeed, some 
prospects of profits are necessary to motivate firms to make costly investment. Otherwise, a firm would 
not be able to recoup its fixed cost of investment. Second, the smaller the proportion of freight traffic 
carried by the owner of the infrastructure, the weaker its incentives to carry out such investment since 
the benefits of investment are shared by other independent train operating companies.30 Thus, by 
decreasing anticipated rates and revenues, an open-access market structure decreases the incentives to 
invest in the network infrastructure. The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in several 
ways.  
First, when we simulate an open-access policy, we assume that marginal costs are constant over 
time. In this way, we focus only on the hold-up issue. This is an important assumption. The previous 
analyses of the US railroad industry have highlighted the importance of operational economies of density 
(see Ivaldi and McCullough, 2001, 2008). Thus, dividing the volume of freight on a particular network 
among operators is likely to increase average costs. This is the cost-efficiency argument. Accounting 
for this effect, the decrease in the anticipated future mark-ups should be more important and the negative 
impact on the investment would be even larger with an open-access policy.  
Another extension is related to the optimal design of the access charge. In this paper, we assume 
a linear access charge equal to the marginal cost of providing access. This allow us to illustrate in 
particular the expropriation issue. Since investment plays a crucial role on the long term performance of 
the industry, maintaining incentives for infrastructure investment should be a major consideration in 
designing the access charge. As a next step, other types of access charge can be simulated. For instance, 
the linear access charge could be set at a higher level to preserve the incentives to invest in the network. 
However, if the access price is too high, then access would not lead to a significant decrease in prices. 
The framework of this paper also allows to consider other types of (more evolved) access charges (for 
example a two-part access charge with a variable and a fixed components), which might even allow to 
relax the tension between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency.31 This topic on the optimal design of 
access charge deserves further theoretical and empirical research and is beyond the scope of this paper.  
  
                                                     
30 This second effect could also be positive for the revenue of the incumbent (see Section 3.2 
31 In a two-part access charge, the fixed component could be interpreted as a subsidy from the Government in order 
to preserve the incentives to invest in the network. 
APPENDIX 1: CONCENTRATION IN THE US RAIL FREIGHT INDUSTRY 
This appendix presents the concentration over time in the US rail freight industry. Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 list all the takeovers that happened in the railroad industry. In this paper, we do not consider 
a takeover as an investment. This is beyond the scope of this paper and can be related to the literature 
on endogenous mergers. (See Gowrisankaran, 1999.) We focus on the issue of panel attrition due to 
concentration in the US rail freight industry.  
In the data, there are two problematic elements in the construction of merged firms, namely the 
merged firms CSX and NS in 1986. These two firms appear in 1986 and are the results of the mergers of 
several firms. The firms BO and CO were merged into the Chessie System, and that system was then 
merged into SBD in 1986. For NS, we assume that the merger parties have sold their assets to the firm 
with the highest market share before the merger.32 Thus, we assume that the firm NW has sold its assets 
to SOU in 1986. This treatment of merger yields an unbalanced panel data with an attrition characteristic 
such that (see Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 17): 
 , ,
1 1,  for all 1.j t jr r t       
This attrition characteristic of the data is an important technical issue for the demand estimation. 
(See Coublucq, 2013.) 
 
                                                     
32 This assumption reflects what we observe in the data for all the railroad firms. 
Figure 10. Railroad firms in the Eastern area 
 
 
Table 7. Railroad firms in the Eastern area 
Railroad Years in data Abbrevation (used in Figure 10) 
Baltimore & Ohio (BO) 1978-1985 BO (into CSX in 1985) 
Chesapeake & Ohio (CO) 1978-1985 CO (into CSX in 1985) 
Consolidated Rail Corp. 
(CR) 
1978-1998 CR (split between CSX and NS in 1999) 
CSX Transportation (CSX) 1986-2006 CSX  
Norfolk Southern (NS) 1986-2006 NS 
Norfolk & Western (NW) 1978-1985 NW (into NS in 1985) 
Seaboard System Railroad 
(SBD) 
1978-1985 SBD (into CSX in 1985) 
Southern Railway System 
(SOU) 
1978-1985 SOU (into NS in 1985) 
Western Maryland (WM) 1978-1983 WM (into BO in 1983) 
 
BO 
(84-85) 
1978 2006 1985 1990 1995 2000 
CO  
(78-85) 
SBD  
(78-85) 
BO  
(78-83) 
WM 
(78-83) 
into 
BO 
in 
CSX 
(86-98) 
merged to form 
CSX in 1985 
CR (78-98) 
NS 
(86-98) 
NW 
(78-85) 
SOU  
(78-85) 
merged to form NS  
in 1985 
NS 
(99-06) 
CSX  
(99-06) 
splitted into  CSX 
(42%) and NS 
(58%) in 1998-99 
Figure 11. Railroad firms in the Western area 
 1978 2006 1985 1990 1995 2000 
UP  
(78-85) 
WP (78-85) 
MP (78-85) 
UP  
(86-87) 
into UP  
in 1985 
MKT (78-87) 
UP  
(88-94) 
into UP 
in 1987 
CNW (78-94) 
UP  
(95-96) 
into UP 
in 1994 
SP (78-89) 
SSW (78-89) 
DRGW (78-93) 
SP (90-93) 
into SP 
in 1989 
SP (94-96) 
into SP 
in 1993 
UP  
(97-06) 
into UP 
in 1996 
BN 
(78-79) 
SLSF 
(78-79) 
BN 
(80-81) 
into  BN 
in 1979 
FWD (78-81) 
CS (78-81) 
BN  
(82-95) 
into BN 
in 1981 
ATSF (78-95) 
BNSF 
(96-06) 
into BN  
in 1995 
KCS (78-06) 
SOO (78-84) 
MILW (78-84) 
SOO (85-06) 
GTW 
(78-83) 
DTI 
(78-83) 
GTW 
(84-98) 
into GTW 
in 1984 
IC 
(78-98) 
GTW 
(99-01) 
into GTW  
in 1998 
CNGT 
(02-06) 
Regulatory 
Change for CNGT 
(GTW was the 
property 
of Canadian National.  
All U.S. activities  
have to be reported  
Since 2002) 
 Table 8. Railroad firms in the Western area 
Railroad Years in data  Abbreviation (used in Figure 11) 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe (ATSF) 1978-1995 ATSF (into with BN in 1995) 
Burlington Northern (BN) ; Burlington 
Northern Sante Fe (BNSF) 
1978-2006 BN ; BNSF 
Canadian National Grand Trunk 
Corporation (CNGT) 
2002-2006 
CNGT (it incorporates all US activities 
of Canadian National Railroad, which 
included GTW activities) 
Chicago & Northwestern (CNW) 1978-1994 CNW (into UP in 1994) 
Colorado and Southern (CS) 1978-1981 CS (into BN in 1981) 
Denver, Rio Grande & Western 
(DRGW) 
1978-1993 DRGW (into SP in 1993) 
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton (DTI) 1978-1983 DTI (into GTW in 1983) 
Forth Worth and Denver (FWD) 1978-1981 FWD (into BN in 1981) 
Grand Trunk & Western (GTW) 1978-2001 GTW 
Illinois Central (Gulf) (IC) 1978-1998 IC (into GTW in 1998) 
Kansas City Southern (KCS) 1978-2006 KCS 
Milwaukee Road (MILW) 1978-1984 MILW (into SOO in 1984) 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas (MKT) 1978-1987 MKT (into UP in 1987) 
Missouri Pacific (MP) 1978-1985 MP (into UP in 1985) 
Saint Louis and San Francisco (SLSF) 1978-1979 SLSF (into BN in 1979) 
Saint Louis, Southwestern (SSW) 1978-1989 SSW (into SP in 1989) 
SOO Line (SOO) 1978-2006 SOO 
Southern Pacific (SP) 1978-1996 SP (into UP in 1996) 
Union Pacific (UP) ; Union Pacific-
Southern Pacific (UPSP) 
1978-2006 UP ; UPSP 
Western Pacific (WP) 1978-1985 WP (into UP in 1985) 
 
APPENDIX 2. ALGORITHM FOR DEMAND ESTIMATION 
This section is based on Coublucq (2013), where additional details are available. 
First, we discuss the endogeneity of the variables included in the estimating Equation (16). The 
price, denoted ,j tp , and the within market share, denoted , |ln j t gs , are endogenous. Thus, the variables 
,j tp  and , | 1ln j t gs   are also endogenous. The discussion becomes more subtle for the variables ,j tk  
and , 1j t  . Using the structure of the model, we know that the variables ,j tk  and , 1j t   are weakly 
exogenous. Indeed, , ,ln( )j t j tk K , and the capital stock is constructed using the relation 
, , 1 , 1(1 )j t j t j tK K I    , where , 1j tI   represents the investment in the network at date 1t  . From the 
dynamic model, we know that the investment is endogenous and it is a function of the previous state of 
the industry, 
1tw . This implies that the capital stock ,j tK , and thus the proxy for network quality ,j tk
, are a function of 1tw  . By construction, the error term ,j te  in Equation (14) is uncorrelated with the 
previous state of the industry 
1tw . Thus, the proxy for the network quality, 𝑘𝑗,𝑡, is weakly exogenous 
since it is uncorrelated with the contemporaneous and the future error terms, , ,j se s t , and correlated 
with the past error term, , , 1j se s t  . This implies that in the estimating Equation (16), the variable 
, , , 1j t j t j tk k k     is endogenous since ,j tk  is correlated with ,j te  through , 1j te  . Nevertheless, we can 
instrument ,j tk  by using , 1j tK   as instrument since the lag of the capital stock is a function of the state 
of the industry at date 2t  , 2tw , and the error term ,j te  is uncorrelated with the state of the industry 
at date 2t   (for the estimation, we have also added , 2j tK   as an instrument). Lastly, we discuss the 
endogeneity of the first-difference of the Mills ratio, , 1 , 1 1 , 2 2( ) ( )j t j t t j t t        w w . Like the stock 
of capital, the Mills ratio , 1 1( )j t t  w  is also weakly exogenous since it is uncorrelated with , ,j se s t  
and it is correlated with , , 1j se s t  . In the estimating Equation (16), , 1j t   is endogenous since , 1j t   
is correlated with , 1j te   and thus with Δe𝑗,𝑡 . We instrument 1 , 1 , 2t j t j t        by the second lag of 
the Mills ratio, , 2j t  . 
To summarize, the choice of the instruments is guided by the structure of the model. Hence, during 
the estimation, accepting the over-identifying restriction may be interpreted as accepting the structure 
of the model as well.  
We now provide the estimation algorithm to deal with the attrition issue due to concentration. 
This is important since attrition creates a bias in the price and the capital parameters. (See Coublucq,  
2013, for further details.) 
In the estimating Equation (16), we have assumed that we know the previous state of the industry, 
2tw , since we use the condition , 2[ | , , ] 0j t j t jE e  z w r . To make the estimation feasible, we need to 
use the following iterative algorithm:  
1) Start with an initial guess of the vector of demand parameters, denoted ?̂? = (𝜃, ?̂?, ?̂?). 
2) Using Equation (12), we compute an estimate of the unobserved state variable that represents 
the unobserved firm efficiency, ,j t .  
3) We compute the probabilities of remaining in the industry as a function of the industry state, 
?̂?𝑗,𝑡(?̂?𝑡), where ?̂?𝑡 = (𝐽𝑡; 𝐾𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑲−𝑗,𝑡; 𝜉𝑗,𝑡, ?̂?−𝑗,𝑡), using a probit model, and ,j tK  and ,j tξ  
represent respectively the sum of the observed and the unobserved state variable for the 
competitors. 
4) The threshold value ?̅?𝑗,𝑡−1(?̂?𝑡−1) = 𝐹
−1(?̂?𝑗,𝑡−1(?̂?𝑡−1)) is computed and we obtain the Mills 
ratio ?̂?𝑗,𝑡−1(?̂?𝑡−1) as a correction term for attrition (see Equation (15)). We are also able to 
recover ?̂?𝑗,𝑡−2(?̂?𝑡−2). 
5) We estimate Equation (16) by an instrumental variable regression using the instruments ,j tz , 
, 1j tz , , 1 , 2, ,j t j tK K  and , 2j t  . 
6) Using the new demand estimates ?̂? = (?̂?, 𝜃, ?̂?, ?̂?), we repeat steps 2-5 until convergence of 
the demand estimates. 
 
APPENDIX 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECK ON THE INVESTMENT POLICY FUNCTION 
This part of the appendix provides the results of an open-access market structure when the 
algorithm allows for an increase in the capital stocks of the competitors (they were kept constant in the 
initial algorithm). We assume that the investment policy function is the same for each firm. Instead of 
solving one equation (see step 11 in the algorithm, section 5), we solve for the parameter   that 
minimizes the norm ( ) ( ) ' ( )N f f   , where ( )f   denotes the set of first-order conditions for the 
investment of the seven active firms in 2006.  
The results are very similar. The average price in the industry decreases by 6% and firm 𝑗 carries 
less freight volume (see Figure 12). These two elements decrease the benefits from investing in the 
network. Indeed, the investment of firm 𝑗 decreases by 10% per year (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
Overall, the consumer welfare decreases (see Figure 15) and the difference between the two welfares is 
increasing over time to reach a gap of 10% after 30 years.  
Figure 12. Market share of firm 𝒋 and open-access
 
 
Figure 13. Investment and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
 
  
Figure 14. Capital stock and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
 
 
Figure 15. Utility on firm 𝒋 network and open-access (in thousands, $1982)
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